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THE USE OF RACIAL STATISTICS IN FAIR HOUSING
CASES
DAVID S. BOGEN* AND RICHARD V. FALCON**
Two housing markets exist in most parts of the United
States. One is black and one is white.' Many factors contribute
to this result-wealth,2 associational preference,3 fear of social
* B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard University; LL.M. 1967 New York University;
Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
** B.A. 1963, J.D. 1967, University of Florida; Associate Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Maryland.
1. The overwhelming majority of black households live in black neighborhoods. It
has been estimated that only slightly less than 800,000 of the approximately 5,600,000
black households, or less than 15% of all black households, live in integrated areas. See,
N. BRADBURN, INTEGRATED NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICA (1971). Other measures of segrega-
tion are discussed in K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES (1965) [hereinafter
cited as K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER]. The most interesting is the author's "segregation
index" which roughly measures the number of persons out of each 100 such persons who
would have to be moved in order to reach a result such that each residential block in an
area would be racially statistically identical to all others. An index of 0 reflects total
integration, and an index of 100 total segregation. Using census data, the Taeubers com-
puted segregation indexes of 85 in 1940, 87 in 1950 and 86 in 1960, figures which statisti-
cally establish the visually obvious: American cities have been, continue to be, and, unless
something is done, will always be very rigidly segregated.
2. The disparity in income of white families and black families is well documented.
As of 1970, for example, 64% of all white families earned more than $8,000 per year while
only 34% of all nonwhite families had incomes of more than $8,000. Median income for
white families was $9,961 compared to a median income of $6,067 for black families. U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION, 1970, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS (Final Report PC (1)-Cl, United States Summary, U.S. G.P.O. 1972).
Obviously, all low income groups are disproportionately under represented in the class of
purchasers of new homes and since up to 90% of all new homes in most metropolitan areas
are built in suburban areas, the exclusionary factor of wealth, alone, would lead us to
expect a disproportionately white ownership of suburban homes coupled with dispropor-
tionate black occupancy of central city dwellings vacated by the whites purchasing subur-
ban housing. That is, the fact of black poverty coupled with the pattern of new housing
construction would lead us to expect some disproportionate amount of black occupancy
of "filtered down" housing located in central cities. See G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT
LANDLORD (1966). Whatever the level of expectation, however, wealth disparity is not
enough alone to explain the grossly disproportionate amount of racial segregation that
exists in the housing market. "Economic factors, however, cannot account for more from
a small portion of observed levels of racial residential segregation. Regardless of their
economic status, Negroes rarely live in 'white' residential areas, while whites, no matter
how poor, rarely live in 'Negro' residential areas." K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note
1, at 2-3.
3. To some extent some racial segregation in residence is due to associational prefer-
ences of the members of the segregated minority group. The extent to which such prefer-
ences are the primary cause of residential segregation is unclear, although it is often
offered as the chief cause by many persons. "I just get the feeling that colored people want
to live in colored neighborhoods." U.S. COMM'N CIVIL RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER
INCOME FAMILIES 48 (1971) (Little Rock broker interview). This "freedom of choice"
explanation hardly suffices as an account of the startlingly high level of black segregation.
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ostracism or physical harm 4-but much of it is attributable to
racial discrimination'.' There are a variety of federal laws prohib-
iting racial discrimination in housing, but they have not elimi-
nated the practice.' Individual suits to remedy particular acts are
inherently impotent to end this societal problem. The Attorney
General must act to end widespread discrimination. Effective
action by his office will depend on the utilization and acceptance
of racial statistics. This article will first discuss the reasons why
individual suits are inadequate and will then analyze the pro-
In fact, the level of black segregation exceeds that of any other ethnic or minority group.
"Negro residential segregation is high even in comparison to that of Puerto Ricans and
Mexicans, groups that on economic measures are less well off than Negroes." K. TAEUBER
AND A. TAEUBER, supra note 1 at 65. "[Njegroes and immigrant groups have moved in
opposite directions, i.e., declining segregation for immigrants and increasing segregation
for Negroes. In terms of sheer magnitude, the Negroes are far more highly segregated than
are immigrant groups." S. LIERERSON, ETHNIC PATTERNS IN AMERICAN CITIES 132 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as LIEBERSON]. As noted in Lieberson's study a multiplicity of factors,
not simply choice, effect segregation, but, even to the extent that choice is operative in
all racial or ethnic segregation, the significantly greater black segregation suggests that
black associational preferences is a factor in only a small amount of the actual segregation
of blacks that exists.
4. Fear of ostracism or physical harm is undoubtedly a factor in some decisions not
to attempt moving to white or predominantly white neighborhoods. Given the history of
public, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and private, e.g., United States v. Guest
383 U.S. 745 (1966), resistance to racial integration, it would be surprising, indeed, if such
fear were totally absent. The extent to which such fear is a contributing factor in racial
segregation is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Obviously, however, such fear
would not exist but for racial discrimination and it does not offer an explanation of
segregation which is independent of such discrimination.
5. Despite attempts to find "neutral" explanations for the high level of racial resi-
dential segregation, supra notes 2-4, any such attempt ultimately must fail. Discrimina-
tion against blacks, because they are black, is widespread, at all levels and in all areas,
e.g., employment, schooling. The effects of such discrimination are self-reinforcing to
some great extent. Thus, inferior education in segregated schools leads to inferior employ-
ment which leads to inability to purchase newer homes which results in segregated neigh-
borhoods in which segregated schools begin their work of attrition on the new generation
of blacks. Discriminatory behavior of any one particular group or agency is never solely
responsible for segregation, but the diffusion of responsibility does not suggest lack of
responsibility. This is no less true for housing than it is for any other area. See U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING (1961) for recommendations recognizing the diverse
nature of such discriminatory acts.
6. Compare U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING (1959) with U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES (1971). As the latter report
discloses, little, if any, change in the pattern of residential segregation has been achieved.
There are a variety of state and local laws also which prohibit discrimination. Their
content, if any, varies from city to city, county to county, and state to state. Generally,
however, they are subject to the same deficiencies as the federal legislation, compounded
frequently with lower funding and lesser power. See discussion of Maryland's law in
Comment, Racial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD.
L. REV. 289, 314-19 (1973). Thus, despite city, state and federal laws against it, housing
discrimination persists.
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priety of using statistics to prove discrimination in housing cases.
THE FAILURE OF INDIVIDUAL SUITS
The various federal fair housing statutes grant to black indi-
viduals the right to enjoin, or to collect damages for, the isolated
individual act of a defendant who has treated him unfavorably
in connection with the purchase or rental of housing because he
is black.' The discrimination, however, may be so subtle or dis-
guised that the victim never perceives it. Even if the prospective
purchaser of housing thinks he has been treated in a discrimina-
tory manner, he will have problems of proof, since he must show
not only how he was treated but also how others unknown to him
were treated. Finally, the delays involved in such suits make it
unprofitable for an individual to pursue legal remedies even
where the discrimination is provable. Therefore, the individual
suit is completely inadequate to deal with the problems of wide-
spread discrimination in our society.
Difficulty of Discovery
Most discriminating acts are hardly so blatant, when taken
individually, that they are easily redressible in an individual suit.
Here the ingenuity of the private individual who wishes to keep
neighborhoods homogeneous comes into play. He can be bla-
tantly discriminatory ("I don't sell to blacks."), or he can achieve
the same results more subtly by various marketing strategems.
Marketing a house is like marketing any other product. One
must achieve "product identification" and "product desire" in
the mind of the consumers to whom one wishes to sell.' Obviously,
if a seller wanted to sell to an integrated group, the first step he
must take is to familiarize the buying public, black and white
alike, with his home or homes. If a seller wishes not to sell to a
particular group, a simple device that assures his goal is to keep
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 3601 et. seq. (1970).
8. The need to "sell" housing, i.e., to "recruit" black buyers is obvious but, to some
extent, underrated and little emphasized in the literature or case law in the area of housing
discrimination. In the employment discrimination context, the need for "recruitment" of
black employees is well accepted. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465 (1968). The same problem
exists with respect to housing. A startling example of the integrating effect of "marketing"
or information programs is described in D. BAUM, TOWARD A FREE HOUSING MARKET (1971).
The project volunteers showed FHA acquired properties in Indianapolis, Indiana to fami-
lies being relocated through urban renewal programs. Integration was not pressed, but well
over half of the relocated families chose homes in neighborhoods not predominantly black.
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unaware the members of the particular group to whom he wishes
to avoid selling.
Blacks are often excluded from white housing areas because
they lack information concerning housing availability in those
markets. The usual source of information about properties for
sale or rent is through signs posted by the owner, newspaper
advertisements, or real estate agents.' The black buyer or renter
usually lives in a black neighborhood and has friends in black
neighborhoods, and he is less likely to discover the for sale or rent
signs in white neighborhoods. In addition, he may not be in a
position to evaluate housing in such neighborhoods because he
has no friends there who can inform him about the availability
of such local public services as schools, pools, and libraries, and
he cannot determine whether the residents of the neighborhood
are compatible with him.
Furthermore, the white landlord or seller who does not want
to sell to blacks is not likely to consider advertising in papers
which specialize in reaching potential black purchasers. Simi-
larly, he is unlikely to list his house with a broker in the black
community.' 0 Even if the property is multiple-listed, the listing
will commonly be among members of the City Real Estate
Board," and that Board may have very few black members. 2
Moreover, when a broker services both black and white custom-
ers, he will probably show houses in largely black neighborhoods
first and try to persuade the black customer to accept them before
considering dwellings in white areas. Thus, a black is less likely
than a white to learn that specific property in white suburban
areas is available.
Aside from the failure to provide listing information, the va-
riety of acts leading to effective exclusion are not only numerous
but can also be quite subtle. A seller or broker may discourage
the sale by merely "negative" acts, e.g.: by failing to point out
the best features of the home; by refusing to bargain on the price;
by engaging in a "soft" rather than a "hard" sell; by failing to
9. L.K. NORTHWOOD & E.A.T. BARTH, URBAN DESEGREGATION: NEGRO PIONEERS AND
THEIR WHITE NEIGHBORS 31 (1965). See also note 65 infra.
10. See R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS (1969)
for a discussion of the ideology of real estate brokers. This ideology is likely to be wide-
spread among the general population as it reflects and interacts with that population.
Thus, sellers are concerned about not harming their neighbors by integrating neighbor-
hoods.
11. For example, see the practices of Chicago Real Estate Board discussed in
HELPER, supra note 10, at 188.
12. Id. at 287. This conclusion is based on a survey made in 1962.
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expose adequately the saleable features and values of the particu-
lar neighborhood; by failing to point out the positive rather than
the negative features of the home, neighborhood, and local public
facilities; by failing to set reasonable hours for inspection of the
premises; by setting and breaking a number of different appoint-
ments; or by failure to ease the buyer's path to a lending institu-
tion. Similar examples would arise in acts of the lending institu-
tion which might simply take an inordinately long time to ap-
praise a house, or to run a credit check, or otherwise to approve
the loan in a timely fashion."
In short, acts which have a discriminating effect often con-
sist of nothing more than doing less for this particular buyer than
a seller, broker, or lender would do if the buyer were some other
person of some other race. The failure to do as much may be an
intentional failure in order to discourage this buyer from buying
or may be unintentional in the sense that it simply arises due to
a lack of enthusiasm over the prospect of selling a home in this
neighborhood to a person of this race. In addition to such negative
acts of a subtle character, there are also a host of discriminatory
acts of slightly less subtlety but which are also difficult to prove.
For example, the failure to show a particular home to a par-
ticular buyer when that buyer is unaware of that home's exist-
ence, or a claim that a particular house is no longer believed to
be available when in fact no contract for the house exists, al-
though less subtle than the other acts listed above, is not so
obvious to the would-be buyer as to carry on its face convincing
proof of intent to discriminate. Finally, there are acts which are
undeniably and blatantly discriminatory, including the simple
refusal to consider taking a person to a particular house or the
simple refusal of a lender to consider a loan application where
sufficient funds are available. In all of these cases, the effect is
similar. The prospective purchaser learns neither of the existence
of other houses or of the availability of funds, so even blatant
discrimination may not be apparent to the victim. At some point,
the black buyer gives up, and the neighborhood remains white.
Problems of Proof in Individual Suits
When a black person discovers that there is available housing
13. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, JOBS AND HOUS-
ING, 80-81 (1970); Hearings on DeFacto Segregation and Housing Discrimination Before
the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity of the Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess., pt. 5, at 2948 (1970). See also the acts described in United States v. Youritan Constr.
Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, at 647 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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which he desires in a white area, he may make an offer for the
house and attempt to get financing. The fact that his offer may
be refused or his application for a loan rejected, however, does not
mean that he will be able to prove:
(1) That the owner (or responsible party) placed the property
on the open market for sale or rental; (2) That the plaintiff
was willing to rent or purchase the property on the terms
specified by the owners; (3) That the plaintiff communicated
his willingness to the owner at a time when the property was
available for sale or rent; (4) That the owner refused to rent
or sell the property to the plaintiff on terms which the owner
indicated would otherwise be satisfactory; and (5) There is
no apparent reason for the refusal of the defendant to rent
the property to the plaintiff other than the plaintiff's race. 4
Given all the possible discriminatory acts that might be done
by the seller and given the rules of proof suggested above, the only
way in which the discrimination could be proved would be for the
rejected buyer to compare, step by step, the treatment given a
black with the treatment given a white by the same individual
seller. In the housing market, the only way to achieve such a
comparison is to use a tester. That is, the buyer must locate a
white person in approximately the same financial and family
situation who will take the time and trouble to apply for a house
or apartment which he does not want and then testify to the
owner's willingness to deal with him. It is difficult to imagine any
other way to prove the elements listed above unless the seller is
so foolhardy as to admit the real basis of his refusal, which is an
unlikely occurrence given growing sophistication about the possi-
bility of achieving the results in a less overt manner.
Unfortunately, employment of a tester has severe shortcom-
ings. First, many blacks, especially those who most need the aid
of open housing legislation, are unlikely to be on good enough
terms with any white who would be willing to serve this function.
The buyer must therefore turn to private or public agencies which
attempt to combat housing segregation. Therein lies a second
major impediment to the use of testers. The buyer may simply
be unaware of their existence, or the agency to which he turns for
help may be unwilling to use testers. 5
There exist several reasons to explain the reluctance of agen-
14. Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
15. See, e.g., L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (1967).
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cies to use testers-aside from the obvious expense in doing so.
The use of testers is an awful waste of time. In order to be effec-
tive, the tester must lead the broker or seller on to a point which
is close to the point of actual sale. This practice, if resorted to in
the bulk of cases in which discrimination is suspected, would
rightfully distress most brokers, whether or not they discriminate,
because, by enticing them with hopes of a commission which will
never materialize, it would take considerable amounts of their
time. In addition, there smacks about the use of testers a sense
of entrapment which is distasteful to most. Finally, the fact of
timing, which is crucial in most cases involving a home purchase
or rental, effectively militates against the use of testers in most
cases save those involving large sales organizations with a repeat-
ing system of sales.
Delay and Defective Remedies
Assuming that a prospective plaintiff discovers that he has
been discriminated against and can prove it, he may still be
unwilling to litigate the matter because of the delays and difficul-
ties incident to bringing an action with a small incentive. While
the victim of discrimination may file a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610 with the Secretary of HUD, that procedure has a short
statute of limitations (180 days), 6 and it automatically delays the
filing of any suit'at least thirty days 7 and possibly longer if the
state must be notified. 8 This delay is critical since a bona fide
purchaser without actual notice of the filing of the complaint or
civil action cannot be affected by the court. 9
If the victim seeks to file suit immediately pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 3612, unless he can get a court appointed attorney, 0 he
must first find an attorney willing to take the chance that a fee
will not be awarded.2 ' He still faces the short statute of limita-
tions (180 days)2 and the possibility that the house will be sold
to a bona fide purchaser before a court order is issued.
If the plaintiff chooses instead to file under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
which has a broader scope of coverage, he still faces the difficul-
ties of obtaining an attorney and the possibility of the sale of the
16. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1970).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d)(1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1970).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
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home to a bona fide purchaser13 and the additional chance that
some courts may delay action in their equitable discretion to force
plaintiff to pursue title VIII remedies."
Finally, having gone through this travail, the plaintiff may
find little reward. 5 Attorneys fees merely put him back to where
he was before he attempted any action. Compensatory damages
are hard to prove, since other housing for a similar price is proba-
bly available elsewhere or, if a higher price must be paid else-
where, establishing the comparability of the two houses would
often be impossible. In fact, any one in need of a new home would
likely obtain it rather than await the outcome of a suit. Having
obtained another home, it will be hard to show monetary dam-
ages despite the destructive effect which such discrimination may
have on society in general. Furthermore, punitive damages in
suits under section 3612 are limited by statute to $1,000. While
this limitation does not exist on section 1982 actions, at least one
court has stated "the limitation in section 3612(c) will naturally
be a consideration in determining the amount of any award which
may be called for."26
In the face of these obstacles,2 only the hardy soul, able to
discover and to prove discrimination and willing to sacrifice his
time and energy with little or no tangible reward in order to
maintain a principle, will bring suit. This is far from adequate to
deal with a widespread problem in society. Of course, individual
actions are important. Persons who are wronged should know that
society agrees and that they may prevail in a suit. Little can
approach the damage done to the feeling of social cohesiveness by
the destructive creation of feelings of alienation. 2 Our point is
23. While the authors are unaware of any case specifically holding that a plaintiff
cannot purchase from defendant a specific house after it has been sold to a bona fide
purchaser, it is assumed that such recovery is not permitted. A contrary result would have
a serious impact on all land transactions and the security of title, since purchasers can
never know whether a predecessor in title may have committed a discriminatory act.
24. Cf. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971) where
the court stated that, in employment discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, courts
may encourage resort to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during the
pendency of the suit.
25. Highly speculative damages are, of course, often allowed in civil actions. See
Smith & Wilson, Reciprocity and the Private Plaintiff, 32 MD. L. REV. 91, 106-08 (1972)
(antitrust). But the willingness of courts or juries to accept a speculative theory of dam-
ages is not something which can be counted on.
26. Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. I1. 1972).
27. For fuller discussion of procedures involved in individual suits, see Chandler,
Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 159 (1973) and Comment, Racial Dis-
crimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L. REV. 289 (1973).
28. This intangible result is, by its nature, impossible to quantify. As predicted in
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different, however. Despite the value which such suits may have
in the context of the individual and as an educative matter to
express symbolically the national goal of equality of treatment,
individual suits are likely to be too sporadic, too unreliable, and
too limited in focus to end practices of discrimination.
SUITS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Congress has recognized that housing discrimination cannot
be successfully remedied by individual suits and has provided a
mechanism for that problem. It empowered the Attorney General
to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 3613 whenever he "has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights granted by this subchapter," or where any particular
denial of such rights raises an "issue of public importance" (em-
phases supplied).
It is clear from the statute that the Attorney General may
bring suit when he discovers a number of discrete acts of discrimi-
nation by a single seller or broker; such discovery, however, will
be difficult. Since a single act of discrimination which is not a
part of a "pattern or practice" does not give the Attorney General
a right to bring suit, the individual is unlikely to bring his com-
plaint to that office. The Attorney General's office is more likely
to discover a "pattern or practice" from information provided by
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development who some-
times refers complaints to the Department of Justice (although
there is no statutory requirement compelling such referrals) or by
searching the court docket for suits filed by private complainants.
Nevertheless, individual suits and complaints with HUD are spo-
radic for the reasons given earlier, and thus are unlikely to pro-
vide the Department of Justice with the raw data with which it
could effectively attack the problem.
Thus, as might be expected, the activity of the Attorney
General has primarily been in anti-blockbusting suits. Such a
case arises where a single company contacts numerous indivi-
duals in a single geographic area, all of whom would seem to have
an interest in reporting such acts to preserve the value of their
homes.29 Suits have also been brought to prevent discrimination
the U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968), this might
well be the most important aspect of segregation. Thus, many blacks feel estranged from
the general society. See Colm Legum, "America's Time Bomb", London Observer, March
24, 1968.
29. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty Inc., 327 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
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in advertising ° and in apartment rental." On the other hand, the
Attorney General's office is an unlikely plaintiff for discrimina-
tion in the sale of houses if several discrete acts sufficient to make
out a "pattern or practice" of discrimination must be shown.
The courts have held, however, that a single discriminatory
act may be part of a "pattern or practice" if several sellers or
brokers engaged in such acts. In United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, inc., a district court had held that three blockbusting
representations made on the same afternoon by agents of a realty
company did not constitute a "pattern or practice" in the absence
of other acts by that same company.2 The Fifth Circuit reversed
on the grounds that the individual acts were part of a group
pattern of all agents in the area and that there is no need to show
a conspiracy of concerted action to prove "pattern or practice."
The court said:
Section 3613 authorizes the Attorney General to bring an
action in District Court whenever he "has reasonable cause
to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in
a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of
any of the rights granted by this subchapter . . . ." Unless
we are to construe the phrase "group of persons" as totally
superfluous, there is no need for each member of the "group
of persons" to be engaged in an "individual pattern or prac-
tice" of violating the Act before the Attorney General has
standing to sue. The statute was thus intended to reach the
rev'd, 474 F.2d 115, 123 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D.
Ga. 1971); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969). The court in
Mintzes even suggested that blockbusting may be the only appropriate suit for the Attor-
ney General.
The remedies provided by § 3610 and § 3612 will be effective in certain types
of cases, but in such a case as this [blockbusting], conciliation has little or nothing
to work on and a private civil action would be prohibitively expensive for the parties
to whom the representations were made, who do not stand to gain or lose any money
or property by the outcome of such a suit. The case would therefore appear to be
an appropriate case for enforcement by the Attorney General as the number of
representations made by Defendants is enough to show a pattern or practice."
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1314.
30. See United States v. Hunter, 327 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971) (injunction denied,
in part, because no "pattern or practice" shown; only isolated instance shown).
31. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971)
(injunction granted on basis that two acts of discrimination after effective date of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 showed continuation of pattern or practice of discrimination which
admittedly existed before the act); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp.
643 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Such suits may depend on the desire of existing white tenants to
have integrated housing unless the Justice Department uses the techniques described in
the remainder of this article.
32. United States v. Bob Lawrence, 327 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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illegal activities of a group of persons even if the individual
members of the group of persons were not engaged in an
"individual pattern or practice." We decline to contradict
the clear inference of § 3604(e) by adopting appellant's ar-
gument. 31
In addition, a single discriminatory act may be sufficient of
itself to be a basis for a suit by the Attorney General. The Attor-
ney General may bring suit where denial of title VIII rights
''raises an issue of general public importance." The dimensions
of "an issue of general public importance" are for the Attorney
General to decide. In a footnote to the Bob Lawrence decision, the
Fifth Circuit said,
It is not for the District Court to determine when an issue of
public importance justifying the intervention of the Attorney
General is raised. . . . [T]he Attorney General must have
wide discretion to determine when an issue of public import-
ance justifying his intervention under § 3613 is raised ....
Once the Attorney General alleged that he had reasonable
cause to believe that a violation of § 3604(e) denied rights
to a group of persons and that this denial raised an issue of
public importance, he had standing to commence an action
in District Court and to obtain injunctive relief upon a find-
ing of a violation of the Act.34
Thus, the Attorney General may have power to proceed on
an individual complaint against a defendant with only a single
overt discriminatory act, but either he must relate the act to the
practices of others, or he must be satisfied that an issue of general
33. United States v. Bob Lawrence, 474 F.2d 115, 123 (5th Cir. 1973). It is possible
to argue that the phrase "group of persons" was inserted to make clear only the Attorney
General's power to sue for a conspiracy among several firms and not to give him power to
sue for individual acts of separate firms not coordinated by conscious plan. The Fifth
Circuit responded to this by pointing out that the language is open to both interpretations
concerning the requirement of conspiracy, but such a requirement would frustrate full and
effective enforcement to eliminate the evils dealt with by the Fair Housing Act.
To interpret § 3612 as requiring proof of a conspiracy before the Attorney
General has standing to seek to enjoin a group pattern or practice of blockbusting
would be to seriously restrict the congressional intent to stop blockbusting practices
and to unjustifiably restrict the power which Congress gave to the Attorney General
to proceed against group patterns or practices. We decline to do so. Even though
there may be no "individual pattern or practice" of blockbusting, a "group pattern
or practice" of blockbusting is established when a number of individuals utilize
methods which violate § 3604(e).
Id. at 124.
34. Id., at 125 n.14. See also United States v. Northside Realty Associates, 474 F.2d
1164, 1168 (5th Cir. 1973); Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
1974
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
public importance is raised. These requirements may necessitate
an investigation of the seller, broker and others in the neighbor-
hood, beyond an investigation of the alleged discriminatory act. 5
The Use of Statistics to Trigger an Investigation
The Attorney General's office, however, need not sit back
and await complaints of individual mistreatment. Visual obser-
vation of apartment houses, new developments, or regions serv-
iced by a broker can provide a starting point for investigation.
Racial disproportion may be seen by investigators for the Justice
Department" or by private groups or individuals notifying the
Attorney General. This should cause a search of records to deter-
mine exact racial proportions of housing rented or sold by or
through such owner, developer, or broker. Where the number of
non-whites who purchased or leased housing from or through such
persons is much smaller than an adjusted random distribution for
the area would lead one to expect, further particularized investi-
gation is warranted. Where disparities are gross, such investiga-
tions are likely to uncover particular incidents of discrimination.
If sufficiently disproportionate, the statistics alone may warrant
a suit although no particular incident of discrimination is known.
The use of statistics to trigger an investigation is merely a
refinement of common sense. Common sense dictates that the
observation of segregated housing provides a basis for investigat-
ing possible discrimination. It may be useful, however, to quan-
tify the factors which would lead to an appearance of segregated
housing but which do not indicate that illegal discrimination in
providing the housing has in fact occurred. Thus, investigative
resources can be channeled into the areas most likely to be pro-
ductive. For instance, an all-white apartment does not indicate
discrimination in rentals if the entire region is virtually all white.
A development of $100,000 homes which is all white does not
indicate discrimination in sales if no non-whites in the area earn
more than $30,000 a year (though the latter fact may indicate
discrimination in education or employment or both).
The enforcement agency, having observed apparent segrega-
35. This would contribute to the delays in suit which are so discouraging to potential
litigants. Thus, it does not relieve the need for statistical use.
36. The Justice Department has had a special team "studying housing patterns in
Baltimore." Apparently, the initial impetus for investigation comes from individual com-
plaints made by private fair housing organizations. This has resulted in consent decrees
involving at least two realtors in the Baltimore metropolitan area. Baltimore Sun, Oct.
25, 1972, § C, at 24, col. 7.
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tion in an apartment, development, or area could proceed in the
following manner. First, it should ascertain the price range of
housing offered by the landlord or developer or available in a
given area through a broker. Second, it should find out what level
of income is necessary in order to purchase or lease such housing.
For purchases, this information should be available from local
lending institutions. Third, the agency should ascertain the total
racial composition of the pool of prospective purchasers with suf-
ficient incomes to purchase or to lease the housing in question.
This is the most difficult task and, in turn, requires several steps.
The basic question is what persons, regardless of race, could rea-
sonably desire to live in a given area. This in turn will depend on
distances from places of employment.
One method of ascertaining the pool of prospective purchas-
ers is to draw a circle (the "residential region") with a radius of
three miles from the point of a development or apartment or from
the center of an area served by a broker (the circle may be larger
depending on the size of the area normally served by the broker).
Next, find out the area where the people within the "residential
region" go to work, e.g. 10% to Town A, 25% to Town B, 30% to
Industrial Zone C, and so on. Compute the racial composition of
the total work force at each such area earning sufficient income
to purchase the housing in question, e.g. 40 % non-white in Town
A, 10% non-white in Town B. 7 Then multiply the racial composi-
tion of the work force with sufficient income in each such area
times the percentage of employed persons from the residential
region who work in the area, e.g. for Town A, it will be 40% x 10%
which equals .04. Finally, add the sums for each area together to
37. For another example, assuming that the housing in question sells for $20,000 and
that a family income of $8,000 would be sufficient to afford such a house, we can construct
a factor for income disproportion for workers in Town B. Approximately 20 per cent of
Town B's population is black. But of Town B's population who can afford to buy homes
in the $20,000 price range, only a little over ten per cent are black. Thus, the composition
of the work force in Town B with sufficient income to buy the housing in question is ten
per cent black.
Individuals with high incomes are not likely to purchase housing available to those
with significantly lower incomes. While the amount people need as income to carry a
mortgage is readily determined by consulting the practices of lending institutions, it is
much more difficult to ascertain the upper limit on income as a matter of choice of the
pool of potential purchasers. So long as the percentage of blacks decreases at higher levels
of income, the error in failing to put an upper limit on income in determining potential
housing purchasers will not produce an unfair result to a defendant charged with discrimi-
nating against blacks. However, it will be important to ascertain such an upper limit in
any suit for illegal steering of blacks into black neighborhoods or discrimination against
white purchasers.
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obtain the racial composition of the pool of prospective purchas-
ers in the residential region."
Note the deviation of the racial composition of the pool of
prospective purchasers from the racial composition of the actual
purchasers of housing from a broker or developer. If the deviation
is great, those brokers or developers with the greatest deviation
should be investigated further. The number of brokers or devel-
opers pursued and the extent of deviation necessary to trigger
investigation would depend on the resources of the Attorney Gen-
eral's staff.
In addition, for brokers, another level of study would be use-
ful. If black customers are purchasing homes in local areas of high
black density and white customers are purchasing homes in local
areas of high white density, a basis to investigate "steering" may
be shown. Again, investigative efforts would be limited to those
firms showing the greatest deviation from the racial composition
of random apartment rentals or home purchases.
It must be emphasized that refinements on statistical models
are unnecessary here because all that is involved is a trigger to
further particularized investigation. Since the inevitable limita-
tion on enforcement resources would restrict the investigation to
those firms with the grossest deviations, more refined calculations
should not be necessary at this point. 9
The Use of Statistics to Prove Discrimination
The statistical basis for proving discrimination in housing
would have to be more refined than that used to trigger investiga-
tions. In addition to the factor for income levels," consideration
38. This should reflect commuting habits in a realistic manner, although it may
result in some distortion hiding discrimination. For example, if there is discrimination in
employment in Town B and discrimination in housing in the region studied, a dispropor-
tionate number of residents in the region may work in Town B.
39. See also the discussion of the use of racial statistics to trigger an enforcement
agency's investigation in the analogous area of employment in Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235, 268-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fiss].
40. Ability to purchase a house depends on a number of factors in addition to income
level. The size of the mortgage needed depends on the amount of savings the prospective
buyer has available for a down payment. The amount of money a bank is willing to lend
depends on job stability, family size, existing debt and even family stability. The incorpo-
ration of every factor utilized by lending institutions, including the varying weights which
differing lending institutions give to such factors, would be a difficult job. For purposes
of investigation, looking to income factors alone is surely sufficient. Similarly it should
not be essential for proving discrimination since income levels are surely the most impor-
tant economic factor in obtaining a loan. While the failure to incorporate savings, job
stability and family size may leave out some individuals who could purchase housing from
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must be given to associational preferences. Unlike education,
where the school board fixes the racial composition by school
siting and attendance zones, or employment, where the individ-
ual obviously wants employment and promotion, in housing the
black home buyer has some control over the character of the
neighborhood and may not desire to move into the white area.
Fixing associational preferences at the degree common for other
ethnic groups" should be sufficient to allow for this factor.42 After
the appropriate discount for these factors is made, neither the
government nor the courts should fear the use of statistics of
racial disproportion as a basis for suit.
Statistics Plus Act
If the difference between the racial composition of the pool
of prospective purchasers and the racial composition of actual
purchasers from or through an individual or company is signifi-
cant and such individual or company has committed at least one
discrete provable discriminatory act, the court should find that
the defendant has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimi-
nation. A "significant difference" is one where the likelihood of
such a disparity occurring in a random distribution is less than
the computation, the inclusion of persons of a higher level of income who would probably
purchase housing of a higher price than that in question adds an error on the high side.
These errors may cancel each other out or may be reinforcing, but are not likely to be
extraordinarily significant given the overriding importance of income levels.
41. See S. LIEBERSON, supra note 3, at 44 and K. TAUEBER & A. TAUEBER, supra note
1, at 28 for statistical data on the level of ethnic segregation and for explanations of the
methodology appropriate for the generating of such data. For example, the mean index of
residential segregation of foreign born whites who come from an immigrant group which
has been in this country for some time was less than thirty in 1950 for a selected group of
ten major cities and much less than forty for all immigrant groups. S. LIEBERSON at 66-
67. This means that to attain the same proportion of foreign born whites in each area of
the city, forty percent would have to be moved. These figures of course are not exactly
preferences in a void but include the difficulties including discrimination facing any
foreign born person. But even using these figures, almost sixty percent of the foreign born
white population is distributed randomly. Assume a hypothetical ten percent figure as the
proportion of blacks in the pool of prospective purchasers able to buy housing in the
$20,000 price range computed in the model set forth supra notes 37 and 38 and accompany-
ing text; sixty percent of them should desire to buy homes in areas which are not predomi-
nantly black. Thus, somewhat over six percent of the population of a new development of
$20,000 homes (using averages) would be expected to be black. If the region involved had
a heavier concentration of blacks able to buy such housing, for example 20% of the
relevant pool, then a correspondingly larger percentage of such housing (12% in the exam-
ple) should be sold to blacks.
42. There is some evidence that much more than sixty percent of all blacks do not
care whether they live in predominantly black areas. See "Fifteen American Cities", in
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
(85%); Trends in Housing, August 1969 at 2 (74%).
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five per cent.43 The defendant's act provides evidence of discrimi-
nation which colors these statistics of racial disparity and permits
the inference to be drawn that the disparity was caused by other
acts of discrimination by the defendant.4
In addition, depending on the context of the discriminatory
act, a single act may affect large numbers of people. A refusal to
sell to a black in a black neighborhood presents a discriminatory
act, but it does not contribute to the creation of a dual market.
Other blacks will surely feel free to look for housing in that area.
However, a single refusal to sell to a black in an all white neigh-
borhood will likely reinforce the segregation in that area and have
an impact in perpetuating the dual market. Thus, even if no other
43. This does not mean that there is a ninety-five percent chance that the pattern
was deliberately created. It means that, assuming no discrimination, an all-white area
would still occur five percent of the time. For example, the chance that a coin will be heads
every time when flipped five times is three percent [which is the number of heads divided
by the number of sides to a coin (1/2) multiplied by itself for each of the flips ( 1/2) or 1/32
which equals .031]. Nevertheless, we would expect such an occurrence to be caused by
chance rather than a two-headed or weighted coin. The likelihood it occurred by trickery
rather than chance depends on the nature of the person doing the flipping. If we do it
ourselves, we may be certain that no matter how unlikely the occurrence, it was a result
of chance and not manipulation.
If we know nothing except the probabilities, we should first attempt to discover more.
If we can satisfactorily explain why we cannot learn more, we may make a judgment of
whether the event occurred by chance or by manipulation, depending on the likelihood.
"In the social sciences, it is more or less conventional to reject the null hypothesis [the
assumption that the observed difference is due to chance and not to a difference between
this group and the general population] when the statistical analysis indicates that the
observed difference would not occur more than 5 times out of 100 by chance alone." C.
SELLTIZ, M. JAHODA, M. DEUTSCH & S. COOK, RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 418
(1959). Thus, we have the Fair Employment Practices Commission guidelines requiring
that employment tests with an adverse effect on blacks must be shown to be job-related
with a 95% probability.
Using the six percent figure (1/16) arrived at in note 41 supra, a development of thirty-
two houses would be expected to have two black homeowners. But the failure of any
particular group of homes to have black homeowners could be due to chance. Each house
has 15/16 chance of being owned by a white person. The chance that each home is owned
by a white is 15/16 multiplied by itself the number of times there are homes here (15/16) 32
which is over 12%. Thus, the lack of black home owners would not show discrimination.
It would take 46 homes before the lack of any black owners could be shown to have less
than 5% chance of occurring in a random distribution, i.e. (15/16)," which equals 0.048.
44. The statistics alone were sufficient in conventional social science terms to indi-
cate that the segregated housing was a product of something other than chance. The illegal
act by the defendant shows a willingness to discriminate. At the 5% level, even if one black
purchased a home [i.e. the provable act had not occurred] the total number of blacks in
the neighborhood will still be less than the expected random distribution. In view of the
defendant's acts, we can infer he also discouraged other black purchasers. See the discus-
sion by Fiss on allocation of burden of proof in employment discrimination cases. Fiss,
supra note 39, at 270-73. See also the discussion of evidentiary problems that make use of
racial statistics necessary in allocating burden of proof in housing cases in text accompa-
nying notes 53-54 infra.
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discriminatory act occurs, it should be viewed as part of a pattern
or practice. For example, one well-known instance of refusal to
sell will cause other possible housing applicants to look elsewhere
without being specifically turned down. If the area is all white, it
may also cause people not to look for housing in that area even
from other sellers or through other brokers. This preserves the
existing pattern of housing segregation." Even if a court is unwill-
ing to view such an act in context as part of a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination, it should at least be considered an issue
of "general public importance" in view of its impact." Therefore,
it should constitute a proper basis for the Attorney General to
bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 3613 either as a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination or as presenting an "issue of general public
importance.""
The Attorney General of course must prove that the defen-
dant has violated the statute. However, he need not prove that
in fact such violation is part of a pattern or practice or raises an
issue of general public importance. "The only requirement is that
the Attorney General have reasonable cause to believe that such
conditions exist.""8 The "pattern or practice" and "issue of gen-
eral public importance" are merely triggers to action by the At-
torney General, not necessarily substantive elements which he
must prove. "Reasonable cause to believe" these conditions exist
is necessary before the Attorney General has standing under 42
U.S.C. § 3613, but the conditions themselves are not an essential
element of the violation of the statute.
45. Since the court in United States v. Bob Lawrence, 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973),
found a pattern by looking to single acts of several brokers, it is not too great a step for a
court to recognize that a single act may be part of a pattern of discrimination which
includes persons other than brokers or sellers..
46. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Pelzer
Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Northside Realty Associates,
474 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1973).
47. Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such
denial raises an issue of general public importance, he may bring a civil action in
any appropriate United States district court by filing with it a complaint setting
forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the
person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of rights, as he
deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchap
ter.
42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970), emphasis added).
48. United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 445 (5th Cir. 1973).
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The statute is violated whenever housing discrimination oc-
curs by a covered seller (section 3604), lender (section 3605) or
broker (section 3606).11 The language of § 3613 giving the Attor-
ney, General standing to sue appears to be designed to confine
intervention to major suits to conserve resources. Although sec-
tion 3613 has been read to require that the Attorney General
prove the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination or
that a group of persons have been denied their rights,5" it may be
possible to read the section as merely conferring standing. Espe-
49. 42 U.S.C.: § 3604. Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by
sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
tion therewith, because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation,
or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin
that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling
is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neigh-
borhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin.
§ 3605. Discrimination in the financing of housing.
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan
association, insurance company or other corporation, association, firm or enterprise
whose business consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate
loans, to deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying therefor for
the purpose of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a
dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial assistance,
because of race, color, religion, or national origin of such person or of any person
associated with him in connection with such loan or other financial assistance, or
of the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of the dwelling
or dwellings in relation to which such loan or other financial assistance is to be
made or given: Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall impair the
scope or effectiveness of the exception contained in section 3603(b) of this title.
§ 3606. Discrimination in the provision of brokerage services.
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful to deny any person access to or
membership or participation in any multiple-listing service, real estate brokers'
organization or other service, organization, or facility relating to the business of
selling or renting dwellings, or to discriminate against him in the terms or condi-
tions of such access, membership, or participation, on account of race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin.
50. United States v. Youritan Constr. Co, 370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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cially in view of the Supreme Court's liberal construction of
standing in title VIII suits,5 it makes sense not to dismiss the suit
where violations of the Act are shown to have occurred. Other-
wise, there would have to be a relitigation of the same facts in
another suit brought by private parties, or the defendant would
be able to avoid the consequences of his illegal acts. There is no
reason such an unwieldy result should exist, especially in light of
the broad remedial language of the statute. Thus, a defendant
charged under section 3613 with a violation of another section of
the Act must defend against the charge of the particular section.
A finding of "pattern or practice" or "general public importance"
will be relevant only for how extensive the remedy should be.
Statistics Alone
Overwhelming statistical evidence of discrimination should
also be sufficient to make a prima facie case of a pattern or
practice of discrimination. For these purposes, we would define
"overwhelming" evidence as a disparity which occurs by chance
less than 2.5% of the time.52
Where no discrete discriminatory acts are found, it might be
argued that no violation of the Act has been shown since no
individual has claimed a face-to-face racial refusal. After all, the
statute defines discriminatory housing practice in terms of acts
done "to any person" or "against any person." But the act does
not require that the person discriminated against be the one who
files suit. 53 Statistical data may be persuasive that specific dis-
51. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
52. Using the figures arrived at in note 41 supra, 56 housing units which are all white
would be needed before a figure which would exist in a random distribution less than 2.5%
of the time could be obtained: (15/16)". The 2.5% figure is an arbitrary one, intended to
be more stringent than the conventional 5% figure mentioned in note 43 supra while not
so high as to be unattainable if a substantial developer or broker had no black purchasers.
The need for a higher requirement than 5% in housing stems from inaccuracies in the
base figure compounded by the likelihood that some discriminatory effects are a result of
acts by nondefendants. The inaccuracies of the figures for racial disproportion flow from
the inaccuracies and staleness of census data, the difficulties of drawing precisely accurate
lines for a region, the problems of a line drawing based upon wealth where houses are
shown by a broker for a variety of prices in a variety of locations, and the unknown
propriety of the factor for associational preference. These compounded inaccuracies are
within tolerable limits if the deviance from the norm is sufficiently great.
53. The section under discussion here, § 3613, of course, provides for the Attorney
General rather than the victim of the discrimination to bring suit. In addition, the Court
in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), held that tenants
in an apartment building could bring suit against their landlord for discriminating against
others. The court pointed out that § 3610(a) allows any person aggrieved by a discrimina-
tory act to bring a complaint to HUD even if the discrimination that injured the complain-
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criminatory acts have occurred although the individual victims
have not come forward. A developer may have an all-white clien-
tele without ever specifically refusing to sell to a black (section
3604(a)) or telling a black that the property was unavailable
(section 3604(c) ), but on a large scale he probably has violated
section 3604 by discriminating in terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith. The individuals discriminated
against may never be found. They may never even know they
were treated in a discriminatory manner. But they exist, and
section 3613 gives the Attorney General power to act whenever
any person is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of such persons' rights.
A second argument against the use of statistics alone as proof
of discrimination is that they simply do not in fact prove it. They
demonstrate a segregated effect but do not show that the cause
is the defendant's discrimination. A large group of segregationists
may decide to move together and purchase all the housing of a
single developer in one day. Although the statistics may demon-
strate convincingly that the racial segregation is not a result of
random chance, that does not prove the discriminatory acts were
committed by the broker or developer. For example, segregation
may be a result of lending institutions' policies or the racial hos-
tility of existing residents.
But requiring the Attorney General to prove that no factor
other than defendant's act caused the segregation is too great a
burden. The plaintiff cannot prove a negative since the possible
causes may be infinite in number. However, if the segregation is
caused by other factors, the broker or developer will be in a good
position to show them. He will know if deals fell through because
lenders failed to lend or if potential purchasers indicated fears
about the attitudes of neighbors. He will also know from his
clients or customers whether they have been treated badly by
other brokers or developers, and he is likely to get the same infor-
mation at professional meetings. Consequently, it is reasonable
ant was directed against another. Complainants under section 3610 may bring action
within a limited period of time if the Secretary of HUD has been unable to secure
compliance with the act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d). Under a broad reading of "person ag-
grieved", as Trafficante indicates the Court is willing to give, blacks in a region may be
able to bring a class action for such a pattern or practice of discrimintaion although no
individual member of the class can show an act directed at them. Thus, the weakness of
the small federal litigating staff noted in Trafficante may be buttressed by private actions
of interested groups doing independent investigations.
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to put the burden on the seller or broker to show that he or she
was not the cause of segregation where the statistics demonstrate
that segregation was almost surely a product of something other
than chance. Thus, at least one court has held that statistical
evidence may provide at least a prima facie case under title VIII.
In the present case, the Valencia and Holiday Apart-
ments have been in operation since 1965 and 1966 respec-
tively, and neither has ever had a black tenant. This evi-
dence constitutes, at least, a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination, casting a burden upon the defendant to come
forward with evidence to the contrary ...
In this case, the facts are even more extreme than in
Parham, in which the court held that the statistical evidence
established discrimination as a matter of law, but, unlike the
situation in Parham, the defendant has provided no explana-
tion at all. 4
As the citations to employment cases in the quote above
indicate, denying the use of statistics to prove discrimination in
housing would be clearly anomolous in civil rights cases.55 In em-
ployment discrimination cases,5" a showing of statistical likeli-
hood of discrimination has sufficed to shift the burden and to
require the defendant to prove affirmatively that he did not dis-
criminate. In one case, a company employed only three additional
black workers although its work force increased by more than four
hundred during the two years following adoption of title VII of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Taking judicial notice that
more than twenty per cent of the state population was black, the
54. United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782 (1972) citing
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 at 426 (8th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Lee
Way Motor Freight Inc., 431 F.2d 245 at 247, 248 (10th Cir. 1970). See also United States
v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F.
Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Note the analogy in the Real Estate Development
Corporation case to the use of statistics in employment discrimination cases by the court's
citing of Parham and Jones.
55. For example, in school segregation cases where a dual system once existed "the
need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance
with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially
disproportionate in their racial composition," without proof of specific discriminating acts
at that school. Swann v. Board of Educ. of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
56. United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 414
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Saint Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 307 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1116 (1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
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court held that the Company violated the Act.57
While the difficulty of showing discrimination by statistics
is much greater in housing cases than in employment cases,5" the
social costs of allowing such evidence to prove a prima facie case
are not as substantial. If the racial disproportion required to show
discrimination is set at a high figure, it may allow some discrimi-
natory acts to go unremedied. But, granted the likelihood that
investigation will unearth specific discriminatory acts and the
scarcity of prosecutorial resources, it seems sensible to accept
that cost in order to concentrate available resources on the more
flagrant cases.
On the other hand, if the racial disproportion necessary to
prove a prima facie case is at a low level, it may result in findings
against innocent parties and provide an incentive for defendants
to prefer minorities to be sure there is no racial disproportion and
thus no suit against them. In employment, this could result in the
unemployment of better qualified white applicants and a possible
diminution of the quality or quantity of goods or services pro-
duced or an increase in the costs of such goods or services to the
consumer. In housing, the result may be to increase purchases by
whites in black neighborhoods and blacks in white neighborhoods
to a degree higher than associational preferences would otherwise
produce. Marginal favoritism in price to induce integration to
avoid suits could also occur, so that the price of housing for per-
sons of the prevailing race in the particular area could rise, but
this is unlikely to amount to a significant sum since the amount
of other-race housing available to eliminate racial disproportion
57. In cases concerning racial discrimination, "statistics often tell much and
courts listen." ... We hold as a matter of law that these statistics, which revealed
an extraordinarily small number of black employees, except for the most part as
menial laborers, established a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
It should be noted however that the Court greatly oversimplified the problem in using
percentage of blacks in population of entire state as a basis. Consideration should have
been given to level of skills and proximity of residence to workplace. See Harper v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (D. Md., aff'd sub nom., Harper v.
Kloster, 489 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1973).
58. This is true because of the uncertainty in the use of the factor for associational
preference. Determining the pool of prospective purchasers in terms of who works near
enough to the residential region to live there is not much more difficult than determining
the pool of prospective employees in terms of who lives near enough to the job to work
there. Establishing an appropriate factor for differences in incomes is not much more
difficult than ascertaining appropriate labor force in terms of skill or potential ability to
obtain skills. But as noted earlier, see notes 40-42, supra, and accompanying text, employ-
ees may be assumed to desire to work wherever the job opportunity is available whereas
house hunters may be more selective.
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is small and the seller is always likely to strive for the highest
price. Further, in all-white areas, this effect may just offset the
historic premiums blacks have been forced to pay to move into
such neighborhoods. 9
Thus, the sale of homes in a development to a substantially
disproportionate number of members of one race should provide
a basis for suit by the Attorney General. Similarly, analysis of
sales through an agent may reveal a pattern of white sales in
white neighborhoods and black in black. This should provide a
case for an illegal steering suit. The use of probability ind racial
disproportion does not affect the individual sale by a private
owner without use of a broker (which would not usually be cov-
ered under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 anyway), but it would
reduce the problem of proof and reliance on an informer otherwise
required in most cases. Further, by requiring an affirmative show-
ing to disprove the case of discrimination, the court would give
the developer and the real estate agent an incentive to broaden
the base of their customers and to disseminate information
throughout the black community.
Racial statistics can shift the burden of proof to the defen-
dant to show that he has not discriminated. But the defendant
may not meet his burden of proof simply by showing that his
actions were neutral on their face. Analogizing to fair employ-
ment cases, facially neutral acts with discriminatory impact must
be justified by business necessity. 0 For example, if an employer
has an all-white work force, a hiring practice based on walk-ins,
generally of people told of opportunities by existing employees,
will have a discriminating effect in new hirings. At least where
the original work force was a product of pre-act discrimination,
that is a violation of title VII.'
Similarly in the housing area, a requirement of securing rec-
ommendations from existing tenants of mobile homes which has
a discriminatory impact has been held to violate title VIII. 2 If
potential buyers go to a broker because of a for sale sign on a
particular house, the broker is likely to show them only that house
59. See U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT, at 468-72
(1968); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS: BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY 78-79 (1968) for statistical datum on differential housing costs experienced by whites
and blacks. For an excellent theoretical economic model illustrating the effect of artificial
restriction in prices of black housing, see Note, The Contract Buyers League Case, 80 YALE
L.J. 516 (1971).
60. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 422 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
62. United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133-34, (M.D. Fla. 1972).
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and others in that neighborhood. As stated earlier, this will result
in perpetuation of the dual market. The broker should be under
an obligation to make his customers aware of all housing in their
price range or at least a selection from both black and white
neighborhoods. In the context of the dual market, a facially neu-
tral act such as showing only houses in the area surrounding the
one which first caught the prospective purchaser's eye will have
discriminatory effects. In view of the simplicity of making known
the wider variety of choices, there is no business necessity for such
a practice. That is, the broker must at least describe for his cus-
tomer housing in other neighborhoods which might meet the cus-
tomer's needs.
The defendant in a case brought under a theory of discrimi-
nation shown by statistics alone could defend in two ways. First,
he could attempt to show that the segregation resulted from the
discriminatory acts of others and that any remaining segregation
not attributable to those causes could be a result of chance. For
example, if the plaintiff showed that the likelihood existing segre-
gation occurred by chance is less than 2.5%, the defendant may
show that lending policies deterred half the potential black pool
from obtaining such housing. That substantially reduces the
amount of segregation which might be attributable to the defen-
dant and could increase the likelihood that remaining segregation
occurred by chance to 5%. If defendant's testimony is believed
and no specific act of discrimination is shown, the jury should
find in his favor. If there is no contest over the validity of defen-
dant's showing, the judge should direct a verdict in the defen-
dant's favor.
Second, the defendant may show that it advertised in media
likely to reach the black community, that it stated its policy of
non-discrimination in all its literature, and that its agents en-
gaged in no discriminatory acts. Acceptance of this testimony
depends on the credibility of the witnesses. If this testimony is
believed, the jury should find for the defendant. In effect, the
defendant can show it is already doing all those things which it
might be ordered to do in a remedial decree, so any action against
it would be futile.
If the defendant fails to meet this burden by countering the
statistics or by showing his own affirmative acts, the court would
find him guilty of discrimination and enjoin future discrimina-
tion. The court should also order the taking of affirmative steps.
An example of a decree which has been followed by several
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courts63 is that ordered in United States v. West Peachtree Tenth
Corporation.64 In addition to enjoining acts prohibited by title
VIII, the Court ordered the apartment owner to post notices
clearly visible to applicants for housing stating that apartments
will be rented without regard to race, color, religion, or national
origin; that such a statement appear in all its advertising; that
all employees of the firm be instructed about the decree; that all
persons or companies engaged by the defendant to act as a real
estate agent referral agency, or otherwise manage or promote
rentals of the apartment, be notified that such apartments are to
be rented on a non-discriminatory basis; that proposed objective
criteria for the rental of apartments be filed with the courts; and
that records regarding each person who makes inquiry concerning
the apartment in the following two years be kept and filed with
the court."
CONCLUSION
The use of racial statistics to prove discrimination presents
problems. Setting a specific expected ratio for random distribu-
tion is a difficult task to do accurately, harder than in the em-
ployment area because of the problem of ascertaining a proper
factor for associational preferences. These difficulties caution
against its imprudent application in all cases, but, where other
techniques for enforcement of non-discrimination are unsuccess-
ful, the court should use such methods rather than surrender to
prejudice.
63. United States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Real
Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). See also United States v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
64. 437 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1971).
65. The affirmative action portion of the order reads as follows:
It is further ordered that the defendants shall forthwith adopt and implement
the following affirmative program to correct the effects of their past discriminatory
practices:
(1) Within ten (10) days of this Order, defendants shall notify the following
black applicants for housing at One Tenth Street Apartments, by registered mail
with copies to counsel for plaintiff, that each is entitled to reapply for an apartment
and that any reapplication will be considered without regard to race or color:
ROBERT PITTS
SANDRA THREADCRAFT
(2) Within ten (10) days of this Order, defendants shall permanently post in a
prominent place in the rental office, or immediately outside the rental office, a
notice, clearly visible to applicants, stating that the One Tenth Street Apartments
will be rented without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.
(3) All advertising of apartments at One Tenth Street Apartments in newspa-
pers or other media, or in pamphlets, brochures, handouts, or writings of any kind,
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shall include a statement to the effect that apartments are rented without regard
to race, color, religion, or national origin.
(4) The defendants shall forthwith fully instruct all of their full-time and part-
time employees with respect to the provisions of this decree and with respect to
their obligations thereunder. Within five (5) days of hiring of any new employees,
defendants shall provide each employee with a copy of this decree, explain its
contents to him and advise him that he is subject to all the requirements contained
therein.
(5) In the event that a firm, association, company, corporation, or other person
is engaged by defendants to act as a real estate agent, referral agency, or otherwise
manage or promote rentals of apartments for the defendant, such firm, association,
company, corporation, or person shall be notified by defendant within five (5) days
of its engagement that apartments are rented without regard to race, color, religion,
or national origin.
It is further ordered that, no later than fifteen days after the entry of this Order,
the defendants shall file with the Court, and serve upon counsel for plaintiff, pro-
posed written objective nonracial standards and criteria (hereinafter referred to as
standards or proposed standards) for the processing and approval of applications
for apartments at the One Tenth Street Apartments. It is suggested that, in formu-
lating proposed standards, the defendants consider the standards approved by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in United States
v. Palmetto Realty Corp., C.A. No. 70-1419 (E.D. La., September 18, 1970) (See
paragraph 11 c of decree and Policies and Procedures, Rules and Regulations at-
tached thereto)
The plaintiff shall have ten days after the filing of such proposed written
objective nonracial standards and criteria by the defendants to object to the same.
In the event plaintiff files such objections, this court will hold a prompt hearing
with respect to the adequacy of the defendants' proposed standards, and with
respect to the merits of plaintiff's objections thereto, and will order the implemen-
tation of objective standards and procedures either as proposed by the defendants
or otherwise. Upon the entry of an Order approving or requiring the implementation
of objective standards and criteria, the defendants shall forthwith implement such
standards and criteria with respect to all applicants for apartments, without regard
to race, color, religion, or national origin.
If, following the entry of an order requiring the implementation of objective
standards, the defendants should elect to alter such standards for the processing
and approval of applications for apartments, by making changes therein which are
nonracial both in purpose and in effect, they shall promptly file such proposed
changes with the Court, with copies to counsel for plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall
have the opportunity to object thereto. Any dispute between the parties arising
from such proposed changes may be raised by either party in any subsequent
appropriate proceeding in this Court.
It is further ordered that ninety days after the entry of this decree, and at
three-month intervals thereafter, for a period of two years following the entry of this
decree, the defendants shall file with this Court, and serve on counsel for the
plaintiff, a report containing the following information for the One Tenth Street
Apartments:
(a) The name, address and race of each person making inquiry about the
availability or terms of rental of an apartment during the preceding three-month
period, and whether such person:
1. Made inquiry.
2. Was offered an application.
3. Filled out an application.
4. Submitted an application.
5. Was advised with respect to earnest money and security deposit
procedures.
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6. Made a deposit.
7. Was accepted for a waiting list.
8. Was accepted for occupancy.
9. Was rejected, and if rejected, the reason or reasons therefor, and the
specific objective criterion which the applicant failed to meet.
The report shall also state the date on which each of the foregoing actions was
taken.
The reports filed pursuant to this Order shall also include a description of all
affirmative steps taken during each preceding reporting period in compliance with
this decree, including copies of letters to Negro applicants, copies of all signs posted
in accordance with this Decree, copies of all advertisements and brochures used by
the defendants (or sample copies of advertisements, together with the dates and
media in which they were published), and written documentation to the effect that
each employee has received a copy of this Order and has been advised of its terms.
The parties are directed to attempt to agree on simplified forms and procedures for
carrying out this reporting provision to assure minimum inconvenience to all parties
and to the Court.
For a period of two years following the entry of this decree, the defendants shall
maintain and retain any and all records which are the source of, or contain, any of
the information pertinent to defendants' obligation to report to the Court. Repre-
sentatives of the plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent
records of the defendants at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that
the plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the defendants from
the inspection of such records.

